Douglas Stebila

Towards a provably secure DoS-resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy

BPV-JFK protocol

Abstract

Just Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al. (ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows' cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when re-using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol.

Keywords: denial of service, Meadows' cost-based framework, Just Fast Keying, client puzzles, key agreement, perfect forward secrecy

Reference

Lakshmi Kuppusamy, Jothi Rangasamy, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd, Juan González Nieto. Towards a provably secure DoS-resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy. In Daniel J. Bernstein, Sanjit Chatterjee, editors, Proc. 12th International Conference on Cryptology in India (INDOCRYPT) 2011, LNCS, vol. 7107, pp. 379-398. Springer, December 2011. © Springer.

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BibTeX

@inproceedings{INDOCRYPT:KRSBG11,
 	Author = {Lakshmi Kuppusamy and Jothi Rangasamy and Douglas Stebila and Colin Boyd and Juan {Gonz{\' a}lez Nieto}},
 	Booktitle = {Proc. 12th International Conference on Cryptology in India (INDOCRYPT) 2011},
 	Doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6\_27},
 	Editor = {Daniel J. Bernstein and Sanjit Chatterjee},
 	Month = {December},
 	Pages = {379--398},
 	Publisher = {Springer},
 	Series = {LNCS},
 	Title = {Towards a provably secure {DoS}-resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy},
 	Volume = {7107},
 	Year = {2011}
 }

Funding

• Australia–India Strategic Research Fund (AISRF) project TA020002