Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK-secure key exchange



Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to capture the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. Increased granularity of security can be modelled by considering partial leakage of secrets in the manner of models for leakage-resilient cryptography, designed to capture side-channel attacks. In this work, we use the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols, namely continuous after-the-fact leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. We resolve an open problem by constructing the first concrete two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the CAFL-eCK model.

Keywords: key exchange protocols, side-channel attacks, leakage-resilience, after-the-fact leakage


Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd. Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK-secure key exchange. In Jens Groth, editor, Proc. 15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding 2015, LNCS, vol. 9496, pp. 277-294. Springer, December 2015. © Springer.




This research was supported by:
  • Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project grant DP130104304