The Case for Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.

Reference

Douglas Stebila, Michele Mosca, and Norbert Lütkenhaus. The Case for Quantum Key Distribution. In Quantum Communication and Quantum Networking: First International Conference, QuantumComm 2009, LNICST, volume 36, pp. 283-296. Springer 2010. Eprint arXiv:0902.2839. © Springer

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Publisher’s website: 10.1007/978-3-642-11731-2_35
Author’s website: PDF, BibTeX
arXiv Eprint: http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2839
Cryptology ePrint Archive: http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/082
University of Waterloo Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research: technical report CACR 2009/10

This is the website of Douglas Stebila.