One-time-password-authenticated key exchange
Abstract
To reduce the damage of phishing and spyware attacks, banks, governments, and other security-sensitive industries are deploying one-time password systems, where users have many passwords and use each password only once. If a single password is compromised, it can be only be used to impersonate the user once, limiting the damage caused. However, existing practical approaches to one-time passwords have been susceptible to sophisticated phishing attacks.
We give a formal security treatment of this important practical problem. We consider the use of one-time passwords in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), which allows for mutual authentication, session key agreement, and resistance to phishing attacks. We describe a security model for the use of one-time passwords, explicitly considering the compromise of past (and future) one-time passwords, and show a general technique for building a secure one-time-PAKE protocol from any secure PAKE protocol. Our techniques also allow for the secure use of pseudorandomly generated and time-dependent passwords.
Reference
Kenneth G. Paterson and Douglas Stebila. One-time-password-authenticated key exchange. In Ron Steinfeld and Phillip Hawkes, editors, Proc. 15th Australasian Conf. on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP) 2010, LNCS, volume 6168, pp. 264–281. Springer, 2010. © Springer. Eprint http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/430.Download
- Publisher’s website: DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14081-5_17
- Author’s website (full version): PDF, BibTeX
- Cryptology ePrint Archive (full version): http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/430
Presentations
- 2010/07/06: “One-time-password-authenticated key exchange.” Presented at the 15th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP) 2010. (PDF slides)
